Zusammenfassung In der vorliegenden Untersuchung wird eine Methodik zur Prognose des sportlichen Erfolgs eines Fußballunternehmens in der Bundesliga aufgezeigt. Um der begrenzten Prognostizierbarkeit des sportlichen Erfolgs Rechnung zu tragen, berücksichtigt das Prognosemodell neben der relativen Spielergehaltssumme, dem relativen Trainergehalt und der Vereinseffizienz explizit den Zufall als Einflussgröße. Das Prognosemodell wird dabei mit Hilfe einer empirischen Untersuchung der Spielzeiten 1996/1997 bis 2002/2003 validiert und spezifiziert. Die Prognose des sportlichen Erfolgs erfolgt mittels Monte-Carlo-Simuladon. Dementsprechend liefert das Prognosemodell keinen einzelnen Erwartungswert für die (...) Platzierung, sondern eine Wahrscheinlichkeitsverteilung. Hieraus lassen sich Wahrscheinlichkeiten für unterschiedliche sportliche Szenarien, wie z.B. den Gewinn der Deutschen Meisterschaft oder die Champions League-Qualifikation, ableiten. Die so ermittelte Wahrscheinlichkeitsverteilung der Platzierung ist wiederum geeignet, für die Einnahmenverteilung eines Fußballunternehmens ebenfalls Wahrscheinlichkeiten zu ermitteln. (shrink)

ZusammenfassungDie rechtliche Regelung der Fortpflanzungsmedizin ist dringend reformbedürftig. Das Embryonenschutzgesetz von 1990 erfasst die neuesten technischen Entwicklungen nicht, ist in manchen Bereichen unstimmig und lückenhaft, setzt die betroffenen Frauen, Paare und Kinder unnötigen gesundheitlichen Risiken aus, erschwert paradoxerweise die Durchsetzung von Kinderrechten und erzeugt Gerechtigkeitsprobleme und Rechtsunsicherheit für die betroffenen Paare und die behandelnden Ärztinnen und Ärzte.Das Embryonenschutzgesetz enthält zudem nur strafrechtliche Verbote. Diese erlauben keine angemessene Reaktion auf die medizinische Entwicklung und den gesellschaftlichen Wandel und werden der Komplexität der (...) Materie nicht gerecht.Diese Probleme müssen gelöst werden. Der Bundesgesetzgeber verfügt seit mehr als 20 Jahren über die Kompetenz zur Regelung der Fortpflanzungsmedizin. Er sollte in der kommenden Legislaturperiode ein umfassendes Fortpflanzungsmedizingesetz schaffen. (shrink)

Jakob Friedrich Fries (1773–1843) was the most prolific German philosopher of science in the nineteenth century who strived to synthesize Kant’s philosophical foundation of science and mathematics and the needs or practised science and mathematics in order to gain more comprehensive conceptual frameworks and greater methodological flexibility for those two disciplines. His original contributions anticipated later developments, to some extent, though they received comparatively little notice in the later course of the nineteenth century—a fate which partly can be explained by (...) the unfortunate development of the so-called ‘First Friesian School,’ founded by E. F. Apelt, M. J. Schleiden and O. X. Schlömilch. This situation changed temporarily when Leonard Nelson (1882–1927) arrived on the philosophical stage and founded a second, so-called, ‘New Friesian School’ in 1903. In the following two decades, Fries’ specific transformation of Kantian philosophy gained influence within the vigorous discussions about ‘new’ foundations of mathematics and, thus, also played a role within the Berlin Group surrounding Hans Reichenbach, though his work had no direct impact on the philosophy of physics being expounded therein. -/- This essay will first outline some characteristics of Fries’ development of the Kantian approach. Then it will point out the limited impact of the ‘New Friesian School’ on the Berlin Group, while highlighting some missed chances for fruitful exchange. As the originality of this school and its importance for the development of logic and philosophy of mathematics—by and large merits of its early members Walter Dubislav and Kurt Grelling —is dealt with in separate chapters of this volume, and elsewhere, this article will focus on what Fries called the ‘mathematical philosophy of nature’ (i. e. the philosophical foundations of physics). More specifically, it will show how the New Friesian School reacted to Einstein’s theories of relativity, in a way that contrasts with the approach of the Berlin Group. This discussion about relativity will also be used to reveal different understandings of the nature of ‘scientific philosophy’ in general, as well as different models of how philosophy and the empirical sciences should interact. (shrink)

Inhalt: Rainer ADOLPHI: Weltbild und Ich-Verständnis. Die Transformation des >Primats der praktischen Vernunft< beim späteren Fichte. Jacinto RIVERA DE ROSALES: Das Absolute und die Sittenlehre von 1812. Sein und Freiheit. Marek J. SIEMEK: Fichtes und Hegels Konzept der Intersubjektivität. Ewa NOWAK-JUCHACZ: Das Anerkennungsprinzip bei Kant, Fichte und Hegel. Ronald MATHER: On the Concepts of Recognition. Makoto TAKADA: Verwandlung der Individuumslehre bei Fichte. Hans Georg von MANZ: Deduktion und Aufgabe des individuellen Ich in Fichtes Darstellungen der Wissenschaftslehre von 1810/11. Jürgen STAHL: (...) Zur Kultur in der Vermittlungsrolle zwischen empirischem und absolutem Ich. Christoph ASMUTH: Metaphysik und Historie bei J.G. Fichte. Stephan GNÄDINGER: Vorsehung. Ein religionsphilosophisches Grundproblem bei J.G. Fichte. Johannes HEINRICHS: Die Mitte der Zeit als Tiefpunkt einer Parabel. Fichtes Geschichtskonstruktion und Grundzüge der gegenwärtigen Zeitenwende. Marco M. OLIVETTI: Zum Religions- und Offenbarungsverständnis beim jungen Fichte und bei Kant. (shrink)

Inhalt: Klaus HAMMACHER: Nachruf auf Dr. Richard Schottky. Edit DÜSING: Johannes Schurr zum Gedenken. TEIL I. Jürgen STOLZENBERG: Fichtes Satz »Ich bin«. Argumentanalytische Überlegungen zu Paragraph 1 der Grundlage der gesamten Wissenschaftslehre von 1794/95. Kunihiko NAGASAWA: Intellektuelle Anschauung und Dialektik. Sven JÜRGENSEN: Die Unterscheidung der Realität in Fichtes Wissenschaftslehre von 1794. Wilhelm METZ: Fichtes genetische Deduktion von Raum undä Zeit in Differenz zu Kant. Peter ROHS: Über die Zeit als das Mittelglied zwischen dem Intelligiblen und dem Sinnlichen. Daniel BREAZEALE: Philosophy (...) as the Divided Self: On the »Existential« and »Scientific« Tasks of the Jena Wissenschaftslehre. Endre KISS: Zwischen Apriorismus und Empirismus im Kontext der Isomorphie zweier Apriorismen. Zur Rekonstruktion von Fichtes philosophischer Konzeption. TEIL II. Erich HEINTEL: Gewißheit und Wahrheit bei Fichte. H.M. EMRICH: Identität und Versprechen. Hans Georg von MANZ: Selbstgewißheit und Fremdgewißheit. Fichtes Konzeption des Anderen als Konstituens der Selbsterfassung unter Berücksichtigung der Perspektive Lévinas'. Alois K. SOLLER: Die Unbegreiflichkeit der Wechselwirkung der Geister. Das Problem einer »Interpersonalitätslehre« bei Fichte. Carla DE PASCALE: Die Trieblehre bei Fichte. Karen GLOY: Die Naturauffassung bei Kant, Fichte und Schelling. Albert MUES: Der Grund der Dualität der Materie und des Indeterminismus in der physikalischen Natur. Die Lösung eines quantenphysikalischen Rätsels. Marco IVALDO: Zur Geschichtserkenntnis nach der Transzendentalphilosophie. Faustino ONCINA COVES: Geheimnis und Öffentlichkeit bei Fichte. Frank ASCHOFF: Rückkehr zur Metaphysik? Reinholds Abkehr von der Philosophie Fichtes. Ives RADRIZZANI: Der Übergang von der Grundlage zur Wissenschaftslehre nova methodo. L. de Vos: Die Realität der Idee. TEIL III. Wilhelm LÜTTERFELDS: Fichtes Konzept absoluter Einheit - ein performativer Selbstwiderspruch? Urs RICHLI: »Ich aber fordere Sie auf, absolute Genesis ins Auge zu fassen!« Realität und absolute Negativität in Fichtes Wissenschaftslehre von 1804 und in Hegels Wissenschaft der Logik. Hartmut TRAUB: Realität und System. Das Realitätsproblem in Fichtes Theorie der Fünffachheit. (shrink)

On February 24-25, 1956, in a closed session of the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Nikita S. Khrushchev made his now famous speech on the crimes of the Stalin era. That speech marked a break with the past and it marked the end of what J.M. Bochenski dubbed the "dead period" of Soviet philosophy. Soviet philosophy changed abruptly after 1956, especially in the area of dialectical materialism. Yet most philosophers in the West neither noticed nor (...) cared. For them, the resurrection of Soviet philosophy, even if believable, was of little interest. The reasons for the lack of belief and interest were multiple. Soviet philosophy had been dull for so long that subtle differences made little difference. The Cold War was in a frigid period and reinforced the attitude of avoiding anything Soviet. Phenomenology and exis tentialism were booming in Europe and analytic philosophy was king on the Anglo-American philosophical scene. Moreover, not many philosophers in the West knew or could read Russian or were motivated to learn it to be able to read Soviet philosophical works. The launching of Sputnik awakened the West from its self complacent slumbers. Academic interest in the Soviet Union grew. (shrink)

Marxist philosophers are increasingly beginning to elaborate a philosophical axiology of their own, to articulate the meaning of socialism in axiological terms. Traditionally, Marxist doctrine has been very eager to present socialism and its motivation as a matter of scientific prediction rather than in terms of value judgments, wishes, or the proclamation of ideals. A more accurate analysis, however, shows that the Marxist undertanding of human social practice presupposes some active striving in relation to which all objects and circumstances of (...) human life receive a positive or negative meaning. It is just this practical relation of human subjects to their world (and of their world to them) that is conceptually grasped by the notion of value.From the theoretical point of view, Marxist axiology is not oriented towards some “realm of values” all values and value relations are understood strictly in anthropological terms as components of human and social practice, as some particular aspects which objects and circumstances assume in relation to actively striving beings and their qualitatively determined self-affirmation on a definite historical level. Marxist axiology presents itself both as a theoretical analysis of these value qualities and relations, and at the same time as a doctrine of practical involvement whose aim is to clarify and strengthen the socialist value consciousness.The basis of all these value relations lies in the system of human needs. According to Marxism, this system proves to be multi-dimensional, encompassing as its fundament the complex of “material needs” which are to be satisfied through work. But equally important and urgent for human beings are those needs and requirements in relation to which all social relations are characterized as being “worthy” or “unworthy” of man (such judgments being in accordance with some historical standard of claims). Finally, there are also those peculiar needs basic to the “aesthetic” qualities of objects as well as to the free (not imposed by natural or social necessities) and “purposeless” activities of human play and self-realization. The desideratum of socialism is to bring about a harmoniously proportioned synthesis in the satisfaction of the totality of human needs for the totality of human beings. Socialism is not only necessary and predictable in a scientific sense but also valuable and desirable for people.Several Marxist (and especially Soviet) authors have worked out the outlines of a Marxist philosophical axiology (V. P. Tugarinov, O. M. Bakuradze, V. A. Vasilenko and others). The opponents of such an enterprise (O. G. Drobnickij and others) have more or less radically contested the value and legitimacy of such a theory of value, for they consider value consciousness as a part of a pre-scientific way of thought. On the theoretical level the abstract specification of such value relationships constitute an artificial separation of the theoretical-practical unity and totality of human relations to the world.The author finds these objections not convincing because the danger of hypostatizing and isolating the “values”, of presenting them as some kind of substantial eternal entities, can fully be overcome by anthropological integration and sociological concretization of the “value aspect”. In a Marxist “philosophy of practice” something is not valuable in itself but is either positively or negatively significant for human beings. Certainly this development of axiology in Marxism is an attempt to set up a counterweight to the traditional scientific objectivism of the Marxist doctrine by confirming the right of people to judge and act “subjectively” on certain issues. (shrink)

Self and Consciousness: Multiple Perspectives. Edited by Frank S. Kessel. Pamela M. Cole. and Dale L. Johnson. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1992. 136 Pp. $16.50 (cloth).

With his “Structural Text Analysis” M. Titzmann tries to give the basic notions of a semiotic theory of interpretation. In spite of this extensive and systematic representation, some problems arise: the additive conception of pragmatics, the static-referential notion of sign, the rigid definition of meaning, the rejection of any alternative interpretation. The possibility of application of the proposed method would depend to a large extent on these points.

Wiplinger, F. Metaphysik, Logik, Sprachkritik.--Mück, O. Wahrheit und Verifikation.--Strasser, S. Zur Konsensustheorie der Wahrheit.--Rivera de Ventosa, E. Dialektik und Dialog.--Schöndorfer, U. Ganzheitliche Erkenntnistheorie.--Lotz, J. B. Denken als Vollzug im Ganzen.--Benedikt, M. Orientierung und Architektonik.--Schaff, A. Ein Marxist liest die Integrale Logik.--Ricoeur, P. Wissenschaft und Ideologie.--Kohlenberger, H. Geschichtsprozess als Integration.--Huber, G. Zur Grundproblematik der philosophischen Anthropologie.--Wisser, R. Schöpfung und Schöpfertum in der Philosophie.--Verosta, S. Zum Verhältnis von Ordnung und Macht.--Schneider, H. Politische Ethik in der gegenwärtigen Normenkrise.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:116 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY Forms not only as objects of contemplation but as patterns of conduct. Presumably the "physicist " is not interested, as physicist, in completing the dialectical journey. So from a moral point of view he rests in opinion, even though his thought may be conversant with Forms. Gully does not like the idea that the philosopher has a privileged method; Plato "gives no proper reason why (...) one particular method or account is privileged" (p. 146).Methods of "collection and division," as developments within the dialectical method, are discussed in the later dialogues, but they never take us to the end of the dialectical journey. Perhaps we should say that the modesty of Socrates in Books VI and VII of the Republic is prophetic. If one is looking for a completed theory of knowledge, one does not find it. Gulley is in agreement with this point, but he feels that if one wants to look for the area in which Plato could have settled on an adequate theory one will find it in the relationship of pure to applied mathematics. He says that Plato develops in his latest thought "a metaphysical theory restricted to the explanation of mathematical knowledge which provides a more satisfactory explanation of the distinction between a priori and empirical knowledge than does the theory of Forms" (p. 187). Yet with a suggestion of surprise he concludes, on Aristotle's testimony, that Plato 2id not "abandon the more general explanation.., which the theory of Forms provided." I 1o not think Gulley wishes to suggest that Plato should have seen the light as Gulley sees it, ~or Gulley conveys the impression of having confronted a puzzling fact. Some readers may be reassured in their efforts to lop off Level IV and commit it to the flames, but the author has presented his case with impartiality. ROBERT REIN'L Arizona State University Monopsychism, Mysticism, Metaconsciousness. Problems of the Soul in the Neo-Aristotelian and Neo-Platonic Tradition. By Philip Merlan. (The Hague: M. Nijhoff, 1963. Pp. 154.) Innerhalb der Metaphysik liilit sich ein Kreis yon zentralen Fragen abgrenzen und durch den Titel "Noetik" bezeichnen. Wie ist der Mensch zur Erfassung des Seins oder des Absoluten (oder wie sonst der Gegenstand der Metaphysik bezeiehnet werden mag) ausgeriistet? Wie verhiilt sich dies ausgezeichaete VermSgen, mages po~ oder poS~,ro~7~K&oder intellectus oder Vernunft hei[3en, einmal zu seinem Gegenstand, sodann zu den tibrigen VermSgen der menschlichen Seele? Und sehliel]lieh: welehe Bedeutung hat die Be~tigung dieses VermSgens ffir die menschliche Praxis? Nach der Gliederung der Philosophie, wie sie im nach-kantischen Zeitalter iiblich geworden ist, liil~t sich dieser Fragezusammenhang schwer lokalisieren. In die moderne Topologie gepresst, erscheint er als eine Verquickung yon erkenntnistheoretischer, ontologischer, psychologischer und religiiiser Problematik. Aber durehgehend ist der "noetische Bezug", will sagen die Ausriehtung auf die yon den Griechen als ~o~ (inteIlectus, Geist, Vernunft ) bezeichnete Kraft. Der Zugang zu der Fragestellung ergibt sich yon Plato her. Die Seele "bei sich selbst," abr,} ~aO' a~r~, d.i. in AblSsung vom Leib und der dutch ihn vermittelten Sinneswahrnehmung, schaut das An-sich-seiende, die eI~, und diese "reine" Erkenntnis wird verstanden als Wiedererinnerung yon vorgeburtlieh Erschautem. Schon bei der Geburt des Menschen findet sich also die Seele im Besitz yon ihr selbst nicht zug~nglichen Erkenntnissen. Bei Aristoteles lebt dieser platonische Gedanke in verwandelter Gestalt fort. Das VermSgen unmittelbarer, nieht-sinnlicher Erkenntnis, der vo~, verhiilt sich nach De anima III zu den,,,m~a (intelligibilia) wie die bei sich seiende Seele zu den "Ideen". Dies Erkennen aber unterscheidet sich nach Aristoteles yon aller diskursiven Erkenntnis dadurch, daft der Intellekt die Intigibilia ist, und dieses Eins-werden, modern gesprochen die Aufhebung der Subjekt-ObjektRelation, gibt der Kennzeichnung des Intellekts als "sch6pferisch" (~o~K6~, intellectus agens) ihren Sinn. Aueh darin folgt Aristoteles seinem Lehrer Plato, daI3 er den Gedanken des "Vorbesitzes ", will sagen der Unentstandenheit der intellektualen Erkenntnis beibehiilt. Aber er gibt ibm eine neue Wendung dadurch, daft er die Ananmesis ersetzt durch den Begriff des ~o~ als einer yon keiner Potentialit~it behafteten reinen, immer und yon je t~itigen b~p.ycta, eines "von aul3en" (~bpad~) in den Mensehen eingeftihrten gSttlichen Prinzips. BOOK REVIEWS 117... (shrink)

The purpose of this article is to define the limits of technocentrism through the analysis of the limiting opportunities of technique and technology from certain value positions. Theoretical basis. The philosophical anthropology of Helmut Plessner was the research methodology. Originality. The institutional use of technology gives it the character of a social phenomenon and turns it into technology. The ability of individuals, which is aimed at achieving a certain goal with the help of certain sustainable techniques, is not yet (...) technology in itself but is only a certain author’s technique. Such subjectively acquired technique can be turned into socially used technology, otherwise, it will be lost. Technology is a technique that has gained recognition and has been mastered by those who did not invent it but used the algorithm proposed by the inventor, a detailed and functionally sound explanation, a method of constructing this technique. But the main thing is that technology is a technique that has received an acceptable justification for society. Conclusions. Technology is not only a means of achieving the goal, it is a way for a human being to transform the world. As such, technology is a component of human himself/herself and changes human – more precisely, a human being changed himself/herself with the help of technologies that he/she creates. However, this creates certain limits of such transformations: technology cannot replace humans in their ability to self-reproduce. Technology is always an element of social communication: the success of communication is interdependent on the success of the technology. Social modernization includes new technologies, but a more important component of social modernization is the new values for which these new technologies are created. Human evolution generates the technocratism at a certain stage. But to the extent that technocracy begins to contradict the values of humans and society, it loses its source of development – human creativity. (shrink)

Objectives:Social isolation is increasing in aging societies and several studies have shown a relation with worse cognition in old age. However, less is known about the association in the oldest-old (85+); the group that is at highest risk for both social isolation and dementia. Methods:Analyses were based on follow-up 5 to 9 of the longitudinal German study on aging, cognition, and dementia in primary care patients (AgeCoDe) and the study on needs, health service use, costs, and health-related quality of life (...) in a large sample of oldest-old primary care patients (AgeQualiDe), a multi-center population-based prospective cohort study. Measurements included the Lubben Social Network Scale (LSNS-6), with a score below 12 indicating social isolation, as well as the Mini-Mental Status Examination (MMSE) as an indicator of cognitive function. Results:Dementia-free study participants (n = 942) were M = 86.4 (SD = 3.0) years old at observation onset, 68.2% were women. One third (32.3%) of them were socially isolated. Adjusted linear hybrid mixed effects models revealed significantly lower cognitive function in individuals with smaller social networks (β = 0.5, 95% CI = 0.3-0.7, p <.001). Moreover, changes in an individual's social network size were significantly associated with cognitive changes over time (β = 0.2, 95% CI = 0.1-0.4, p =.003), indicating worse cognitive function with shrinking social networks. Conclusion:Social isolation is highly prevalent among oldest-old individuals, being a risk factor for decreases in cognitive function. Consequently, it is important to maintain a socially active lifestyle into very old age. Likewise, this calls for effective ways to prevent social isolation. (shrink)

Perhaps, as Professor Battaglia remarks in his Introduction, the German people has the philosophical vocation: Si può persino dire, con una certa enfasi, che il popolo tedesco ha ‘la’ vocazione filosofica. Certainly it was a happy idea to invite distinguished German and Austrian philosophers to explain each his philosophical standpoint. The project was successfully carried out by the Institute of Philosophy in the University of Bologna. The list of contributors speaks for itself: Theodor W Adorno, Ernst Bloch, Leo Gabriel, Hans (...) G Gadamer, Romano Guardini, Dietrich von Hildebrand, Helmut Kuhn, Ludwig Landgrebe, Johannes Baptista Lotz, Karl Löwith, Friedrich Max Müller, Josef Pieper, Helmut Plessner, Fritz-Joachim von Rintelen, Amadeo Silva-Tarouca, Ernst Topitsch, and Carl F von Weizsäcker. The page or two of biography that precedes each essay is helpful; there are as many contrasts here as there are between the different philosophical perspectives outlined by the contributors; and there is one striking similarity in the interruption of the careers of so many of these men—all now in their sixties or older—by the Nazi period. Professor Felice Battaglia’s Introduzione deserves to stand with the other contributions; it is a summary that weaves together with considerable skill the strands of German philosophy represented by writers as various as Bloch and Guardini or Pieper and Plessner. German philosophy, he points out, has come a long way from the gnoseological problems of Kant or the absolutism of Hegel; it has unexpectedly found its way, via phenomenology and existentialism, back to a situation in which one can say: Teologia non spaventa molti pensatori tedeschi. (shrink)

Perhaps, as Professor Battaglia remarks in his Introduction, the German people has the philosophical vocation: Si può persino dire, con una certa enfasi, che il popolo tedesco ha ‘la’ vocazione filosofica. Certainly it was a happy idea to invite distinguished German and Austrian philosophers to explain each his philosophical standpoint. The project was successfully carried out by the Institute of Philosophy in the University of Bologna. The list of contributors speaks for itself: Theodor W Adorno, Ernst Bloch, Leo Gabriel, Hans (...) G Gadamer, Romano Guardini, Dietrich von Hildebrand, Helmut Kuhn, Ludwig Landgrebe, Johannes Baptista Lotz, Karl Löwith, Friedrich Max Müller, Josef Pieper, Helmut Plessner, Fritz-Joachim von Rintelen, Amadeo Silva-Tarouca, Ernst Topitsch, and Carl F von Weizsäcker. The page or two of biography that precedes each essay is helpful; there are as many contrasts here as there are between the different philosophical perspectives outlined by the contributors; and there is one striking similarity in the interruption of the careers of so many of these men—all now in their sixties or older—by the Nazi period. Professor Felice Battaglia’s Introduzione deserves to stand with the other contributions; it is a summary that weaves together with considerable skill the strands of German philosophy represented by writers as various as Bloch and Guardini or Pieper and Plessner. German philosophy, he points out, has come a long way from the gnoseological problems of Kant or the absolutism of Hegel; it has unexpectedly found its way, via phenomenology and existentialism, back to a situation in which one can say: Teologia non spaventa molti pensatori tedeschi. (shrink)

IN MANY CHURCH-BODY DISPUTES OVER THE MORAL STATUS OF SAME-gender unions, the last line of defense against the affirmation of such unions is often an appeal to homosexual orientation as inherently "disordered," rendering same-gender unions unacceptable regardless of the loving and just qualities they may embody. On the basis of a biblical anthropology shaped by the eschatological orientation of the scriptures and further enhanced by contemporary Trinitarian discourse, this essay engages and challenges this traditional view as it has been developed (...) in the theological ethics of Helmut Thielicke. In so doing, the essay raises a key metaethical question of the theological foundations that inform Christian sexual ethics in general. (shrink)